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Keynote Address: Untying the Moral 
Knot of Abortion 
Caitlin E. Borgmann∗ 
Abortion is commonly identified as one of the most 
compelling moral issues of our time.1 Politicians and the media 
describe the debate in dramatic terms, often referring to it as a 
“war.”2 These theatrical descriptions have done a disservice to our 
public conversation about abortion, in that they have functioned 
as a “conversation stopper.”3 We assume that there are two sides, 
that these two sides are far apart, and that they are irrevocably 
entrenched. We are also led to believe that the key moral 
question in the debate is the value of the embryo or fetus.4 I 
argue that these perceptions are false. If we look beyond the 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. These remarks were presented 
as a keynote address at the Symposium, Roe at 40—The Controversy Continues, 
held at Washington and Lee School of Law on November 8, 2014. The author 
thanks Carol Sanger for helpful conversations, and participants in a faculty 
forum at CUNY School of Law for comments on an earlier version of this 
address. The author is grateful to Dean Sam Calhoun and members of the 
Washington and Lee Law Review for inviting her to present this address. 
1. See, e.g., The Abortion War, ALJAZEERA (Aug. 29, 2012, 2:41 PM), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/faultlines/2012/08/20128288841399701.h
tml (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (“Since it was legalised in 1973, the issue of 
abortion has polarised the US . . . . Why is a medical procedure being reframed 
as a deeply divisive moral issue in the US?”).  
 2. Id.; Robin Marty, The Next Battle in the Abortion Wars, POLITICO (Jan. 
14, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/south-dakota-
abortion-wars-103596.html#.Ux1aIdyZbZc (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Meaning of “Life”: Belief and Reason in the 
Abortion Debate, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 553 (2009) [hereinafter 
Borgmann, The Meaning]. 
 4. See, e.g., Bonnie Steinbock, Abortion, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND 
BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR 
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 1–4 (Mary Crowley ed. 2008) (“The 
central ethical question in the abortion debate is over the moral status of the 
embryo and fetus.”), available at http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Publications/ 
BriefingBook/Detail.aspx?id=2400. 
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hyperbole, we see that most people do not view the issue in such 
stark terms. The public holds complex and sometimes 
contradictory views about the morality of abortion. For most of 
the public, abortion seems to present a muddle of potential moral 
questions, and the most pressing among them apparently have 
relatively little to do with the moral status of the embryo or fetus, 
and much to do with judgments about women’s appropriate 
behavior and their proper role in society.5  
These subtleties do not make for exciting news headlines. 
But they are critical for us to understand. We cannot know 
whether a given abortion restriction makes sense if we do not 
know what societal problem or moral evil it aims to ameliorate. 
Today, I want to begin to untangle the moral knot of abortion so 
that we can try to have an honest conversation about what is 
really at stake. In the end, I will argue, the moral aspect of 
abortion that we should see codified in law is a woman’s dignity 
and autonomy in making her own decision about the fate of her 
pregnancy and, thereby, her life. I conclude that this concept of 
autonomy is far better protected by the Roe v. Wade6 decision 
than by the undue burden standard of Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.7 
In the summer of 2013, Texas passed a controversial new set 
of abortion restrictions, some of which have been challenged in 
federal court.8 The federal district judge’s opinion in the case 
described the abortion debate in the dramatic terms we typically 
find in the media and in political discourse. Judge Yeakel wrote: 
Today there is no issue that divides the people of this country 
more than abortion. It is the most divisive issue to face this 
country since slavery. When compared with the intensity, 
emotion, and depth of feeling expressed with regard to 
abortion, the recent arguments on affordable healthcare, 
                                                                                                     
 5. E.g., David H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1886 
(1995); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 
356 (1992). 
 6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 7. 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
 8. See generally Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health 
Servs. v. Abbott, No. 1:13-CV-862-LY, 2013 WL 5781583 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 
2013), rev’d in part No. 13-51008, 2014 WL 1257965 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2014). 
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increasing the debt ceiling, and closing the government retreat 
to near oblivion.9  
This statement should give us pause. Is the country really this 
exercised over abortion? Is the issue more divisive than 
segregation? Than the internment of Japanese-Americans? Than 
red baiting? Than the Vietnam War? When Texas Governor Rick 
Perry convened a special legislative session to consider the 
omnibus abortion legislation,10 a poll showed that eighty percent 
of Texas voters did not want abortion to be raised during the 
special session, sixty-three percent said the state has enough 
restrictions on abortion, and seventy-one percent thought that 
the Governor and the legislature should be more focused on the 
economy and jobs.11 Judge Yeakel’s description is clearly 
hyperbole, yet this kind of hyperbole about abortion is so common 
that we often take it for granted.  
It is also irresponsible and unhelpful. For decades, the media 
and politicians have grown accustomed to describing the abortion 
debate as a heated battle that divides the country.12 And while 
this black-and-white portrayal does not depict reality, the public 
seems drawn to its simplicity. The abortion debate has fallen prey 
to the more general phenomenon of news as entertainment.13 We 
                                                                                                     
 9. Id. at *1. 
 10. See Josh Rubin, After Divisive Debate, Texas Senate Approves 
Restrictive Abortion Measure, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/ 
politics/texas-abortion-measure/ (last updated July 23, 2013) (last visited Jan. 8, 
2014) (explaining that the Texas governor called a “second special session” of the 
state legislature to consider the abortion bill) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 11. Texas Voters Oppose Governor Perry’s Omnibus Abortion Bill, 
GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RES. (June 20, 2013), http://gqrr.com/ 
articles/2013/06/20/texas-voters-oppose-governor-perry-s-omnibus-abortion-bill/ 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Texas Voters] (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See, e.g., Julie Rovner, State Battles Over Abortion and Family 
Planning Heating Up, NPR.ORG (May 27, 2011, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/05/27/136717917/state-battles-over-abort 
ion-and-family-planning-heat-up (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (“The national 
debate on abortion continues on a high boil in several states.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, CULTURE WAR? ix (2005); Jack M. Balkin, 
How Mass Media Simulate Political Transparency 3 (Yale Law Sch. Legal 
Scholarship Repository, Paper No. 259, 1999), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1258&context=fs
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are more captivated by what Jack Balkin calls the “sporting 
elements of political conflict”14—the battles, the winners and 
losers, the polarization—than by the substantive aspects of public 
policy.15 Indeed, viewing the abortion battle as hopelessly 
intractable relieves us from having to grapple with the more 
difficult questions of what the public actually believes and what 
that means for abortion policy. 
Before turning to a closer examination of the public’s actual 
views on abortion, we might ask why it is that we do not typically 
have this conversation. The problem is, in part, that the public 
debate is dominated by politicians and advocates, none of whom 
seem particularly interested in focusing on the messy middle of 
public opinion.16  
Pro-life activists have no interest in highlighting the gulf 
between their own extreme views and the views of the public. 
They prefer to gloss over these differences with the vague but 
appealing term “life.” I have referred to the term “life” as a 
Rorschach inkblot—its meaning is in the eye of the beholder.17 
“Life” looks at the issue with a soft focus lens, obscuring the clear 
moral lines that might offend or alienate the public. The term 
appeals to people because we are never forced to pin down what it 
means: Does it mean the embryo is just like a person, and 
therefore that abortion is murder? Or does it merely mean that 
the embryo is biologically alive? Does it mean the embryo has the 
potential to become a person who has a meaningful life, with the 
kinds of emotional attachments and commitments we associate 
with our own lives? The soft-focus lens of the term “life” allows 
the pro-life movement to avoid staking out a specific moral 
position. This rhetoric does not clarify the moral aspect of 
abortion at all—indeed, that is its very point. 
Abortion rights advocates, on the other hand, often think 
that it’s possible to “bracket” the moral question of abortion, as 
                                                                                                     
s_papers&sei-redir=1. 
 14. Balkin, supra note 13, at 3. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See FIORINA, supra note 13, at ix. 
 17. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th Anniversary: A Moment of 
Truth for the Anti-Abortion Rights Movement, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 
246–47 (2013) [hereinafter Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th]. 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS 1303 
Thomas Nagel has put it.18 They prefer not to have a conversation 
about the moral status of the embryo because they want people to 
be able to make up their own minds about it.19 As a result, they 
do not challenge the meaning or consistency of a person’s 
statement that “life begins at conception.” Rather, they tend to 
simply say, it’s fine for you to believe that, but don’t impose it on 
other people. 
Unfortunately, the public is not too interested in having its 
own views examined in detail either. The black-and-white 
depiction of abortion as a fierce battle is a much simpler and 
more fascinating story. And the images the media feeds us seem 
to support its validity. The news coverage features impassioned 
politicians and advocates who state their positions in stark, easy-
to-grasp terms. We see images of fervent protestors with signs, 
and we watch fury against abortion translate to violence when 
abortion providers are murdered.  
In fact, though, most Americans do not align themselves with 
either side in this abortion “war.”20 Decades of polling show that 
the black-and-white depiction of the abortion debate is not 
accurate. In 2012, the American Enterprise Institute published a 
public opinion study that summarized polling data on abortion 
from 1975 to 2011.21 The study concluded that “[o]pinion on 
abortion has been very stable . . . . [I]t is also deeply 
ambivalent.”22 While substantial numbers agree with the 
statement, “abortion is murder,” there is broad support for the 
idea that abortion should be the woman’s decision.23 The 
researchers found that the majority of Americans do not want 
Roe v. Wade to be overturned, but they favor restrictions on 
                                                                                                     
 18. Thomas Nagel, Progressive but Not Liberal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 25, 
2006), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/may/25/progressive-but-
not-liberal/?page=1 (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 19. See Borgmann, The Meaning, supra note 3, at 555. 
 20. See FIORINA, supra note 13, at 34, 52–54 (arguing that the common 
claim of American polarization over the issue of abortion is false).  
 21. KARLYN BOWMAN & ANDREW RUGG, AM. ENTER. INST., ATTITUDES ABOUT 
ABORTION 2 (2012), http://www.aei.org/files/2012/01/20/-attitudes-about-abortion-
39-years-of-polling_131350993384.pdf (compiling and summarizing polling 
results on abortion since Roe v. Wade).  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 3–6. 
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abortion, including notification of spouses, parental consent, 
twenty-four-hour waiting periods, and bans on publicly funded 
abortions.24 
We need to look more closely at what seems to motivate the 
public’s views on abortion, including the restrictions it appears to 
support. Good public policy demands a clear understanding of the 
problem it is supposed to address. Once we understand what 
problem the public wants fixed, we can assess questions like 
whether that justification can validly support a law restricting 
women’s autonomy, whether it is based on a sound factual 
foundation, and whether the proposed restriction actually 
furthers its objective. 
Polls consistently show that Americans do not want to ban 
abortion, although they do support many restrictions on it.25 It is 
not just polling data that demonstrate the public’s unwillingness 
to ban abortion. Even states like Mississippi and South Dakota, 
which have led the nation in passing onerous and creative new 
abortion restrictions, have not been able to get voters to approve 
embryonic personhood measures or abortion bans through ballot 
initiatives.26 It is perhaps even an open question whether the 
public would, if asked to vote directly, support many of the less 
extreme restrictions we are seeing passed today. The Texas 
omnibus bill was highly unpopular, according to polls.27 
Similarly, so-called “partial-birth abortion” bans were perceived 
to have broad public support.28 But on the few occasions when the 
                                                                                                     
 24. Id. at 17–18, 20–21. 
 25. Id. at 2. 
 26. See Mississippi Life Begins at the Moment of Fertilization Amendment, 
Initiative 26 (2011), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Mississippi_Life_ 
Begins_at_the_Moment_of_Fertilization_Amendment,_Initiative_26_(2011) (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2014) (reporting that a majority of Mississippi residents voted 
against a ballot measure defining life as beginning at conception) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); South Dakota Abortion Ban, Initiated 
Measure 11 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/South_Dakota_ 
Abortion_Ban,_Initiated_Measure_11_(2008) (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) 
(reporting that a majority of South Dakota citizens voted against a ban on 
abortion that contained only a few exceptions) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 27. See Texas Voters, supra note 11 (reporting that a majority of Texas 
voters believed the state already had enough restrictions on abortion and that 
the state government’s efforts should be devoted to other problems). 
 28. BOWMAN & RUGG, supra note 21, at 19. 
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public was invited to weigh in directly on the issue via ballot 
initiatives, voters rejected the bans.29 Nevertheless, polls do show 
that the public supports, at least in theory, restrictions like 
parental involvement laws, waiting periods, and funding bans.30 
What might account for this? 
The public’s opposition to abortion bans, coupled with its 
support for lesser restrictions, shows that the public does not 
view an embryo or fetus as a person, or abortion as murder. 
Polling results confirm this, especially as to the early stages of 
pregnancy. For example, most Americans are morally 
unconcerned with the destruction of embryos in contexts other 
than abortion. Large majorities of the public in a recent Pew 
Research Center poll thought that non-abortion procedures that 
involve the destruction of embryos, including embryonic stem cell 
research and in vitro fertilization, are either morally acceptable 
or are not a moral issue at all.31 And even as to later stages of 
                                                                                                     
 29. See, e.g., Colorado Partial-Birth Abortion Act (1998), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Partial-Birth_Abortion_Act_(1998) (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2014) (reporting that a majority of Colorado citizens voted against a 
“partial-birth abortion” ban) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Maine Partial-Birth Abortion Initiative, Question 1 (1999), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Maine_Partial-Birth_Abortion_Initiative,_Question_1_ 
(1999) (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (reporting that a majority of Maine citizens 
voted against a “partial-birth abortion” ban) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 30. BOWMAN & RUGG, supra note 21, at 17–18, 20–21. 
 31. See Abortion Viewed in Moral Terms: Fewer See Stem Cell Research 
and IVF as Moral Issues, PEW RES. CENTER (Aug. 15, 2013), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/08/15/abortion-viewed-in-moral-terms/ (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Abortion Viewed in Moral Terms] (showing 
that only 22% of the United States adult population believes embryonic stem 
cell research is morally wrong and only 12% believes in-vitro fertilization is 
morally wrong, the rest believing these procedures are morally acceptable or not 
a moral issue at all) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In vitro 
fertilization (IVF) in the United States nearly always entails creating extra 
human embryos (that is, inseminating more eggs than will be transferred in a 
given cycle). See Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Embryo Disposal Practices in IVF 
Clinics in the United States, 22 POL. & LIFE SCI. 4, 6 (2004), available at 
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=bioethics_
papers (explaining that 97% of the IVF clinics studied create extra embryos). 
While practices at IVF clinics vary, the vast majority of clinics that create excess 
embryos dispose of at least some of these. See id. (explaining that 94% of clinics 
studies practiced some form of embryo disposal). 
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pregnancy, the public supports abortion in circumstances that 
would appear incompatible with viewing a fetus as a person.32 
What then could be driving the public’s support of abortion 
restrictions? One could say that the public believes that embryos 
and fetuses have value, just not as much value as a person. This 
would mean that the state’s power to protect them might be 
outweighed in certain circumstances. Certainly this could explain 
why the public would tolerate or support some restrictions. But 
the embryo’s moral value does not change depending on the 
woman’s reasons for obtaining an abortion. Therefore, we still 
must account for how the public distinguishes among those 
considerations that outweigh the embryo or fetus’s right to exist 
and those that do not. This is especially so when it comes to 
restrictions on early abortions since the public apparently places 
relatively low value on embryonic life, as evidenced by its lack of 
concern for the destruction of embryos in other contexts. 
Virtually all of the common restrictions states have imposed 
on abortion since Roe are the product of a pro-life movement 
strategy to dismantle the right to abortion one incremental step 
at a time.33 A major goal of the incrementalist strategy has been 
to create public disfavor for abortion by making it disfavored in 
the law. Thus, movement leaders have supported measures like 
requiring parental involvement in minors’ abortion decisions or 
making women wait twenty-four hours before getting an 
abortion.34 Incremental restrictions are designed to insidiously 
chip away at the constitutional right to abortion. They are 
usually promoted under some other justification than stopping 
abortions, such as protecting women’s health.35 There are two 
possible reasons why the general public may support such 
                                                                                                     
 32. See, e.g., Abortion Poll Finds Support for 20-Week Ban, HUFFINGTON 
POST (July 11, 2013, 7:25 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/ 
07/11/abortion-poll_n_3575551.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. See Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th, supra note 17, at 245–47 
(discussing this strategy); Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. 
Coleson, Attorneys at Law, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, to Whom It May Concern 
(Aug. 7, 2007) (on file with the author) (same).  
 34. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th, supra note 17, at 245; see also 
Memorandum from Bopp & Coleson, supra note 33 (justifying support for these 
measures). 
 35. See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (discussing TRAP laws). 
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incremental restrictions. One is that people may be misled into 
thinking that the stated justifications are sincere and are 
grounded in fact. The other is that their support is influenced by 
the black-and-white rhetoric that abortion is wrong. Let us 
consider each in turn. 
Most incremental restrictions are premised on some implicit 
or explicit factual assumption about abortion, women, or abortion 
providers. For example, parental notice requirements imply that 
most teens do not voluntarily talk to their parents about abortion, 
and that a law will make them more likely to do it. In fact, both of 
these assumptions are false.36 Similarly, so-called “informed 
consent” requirements are often justified on the grounds that 
abortion is physically dangerous because, for example, it causes 
breast cancer or increases a woman’s risk of suicide.37 Neither of 
these assertions is backed up by science.38 Moreover, abortion is 
one of the safest medical procedures, with 0.3% of patients in the 
United States experiencing a major complication.39 Targeted 
                                                                                                     
 36. See UCSF BIXBY CTR. FOR GLOBAL REPROD. HEALTH, ADOLESCENTS AND 
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION FOR ABORTION 2 (2008), http://bixbycenter.ucsf.edu/ 
publications/files/ParentalNotification_2008Sep.pdf (summarizing studies and 
explaining that 61% of girls in states without parental involvement laws involve 
at least one parent in their abortion decisions, and that “[t]here is no evidence 
that a government mandate will positively increase the frequency or quality of 
communication” between parents and daughters). 
 37. See, e.g., Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion 
Counseling Policies and the Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, 10 
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 6, 11 (2007), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ 
gpr/10/4/gpr100406.pdf (noting that six states refer to a possible higher breast 
cancer risk and four states indicate the risk of “experience[ing] suicidal 
thoughts” or “suffer[ing] from ‘postabortion traumatic stress syndrome’” in 
materials given to those considering an abortion as part of “informed consent” 
requirements). 
 38. See, e.g., Summary Report: Early Reproductive Events and Breast 
Cancer Workshop, NAT’L CANCER INST., (Mar. 4, 2003), http://www. 
cancer.gov/cancer topics/causes/ere/workshop-report (last updated Jan. 12, 2010) 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (evaluating evidence on reproductive events and 
breast cancer, and concluding that “[i]nduced abortion is not associated with an 
increase in breast cancer risk”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1175, 1179–87 (2014) (discussing scientific evidence showing that abortion does 
not cause mental health problems). 
 39. Susan A. Cohen, New Data on Abortion Incidence, Safety Illuminate 
Key Aspects of Worldwide Abortion Debate, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 2, 4 
(2007).  
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regulation of abortion providers and facilities, also known as 
TRAP laws, are based on the false assertion that abortion is 
poorly regulated and performed in an unsafe manner.40 An 
example of such a law is the Texas requirement that abortion 
providers have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital.41 This 
restriction wrongly implies that abortion patients will often end 
up in emergency rooms and that most other providers of 
outpatient procedures have such admitting privileges.42 TRAP 
laws ignore that abortion is not only exceptionally safe but is one 
of the most heavily regulated of medical procedures.43 If the 
public accepts the false factual assertions made in support of 
these restrictions, they may support them because they believe 
they are really protecting women. 
Another possible explanation for the public’s support of 
incremental restrictions has more to do with the vague pro-life 
rhetoric denouncing abortion. This rhetoric fuels imprecise, 
poorly thought-out moral impressions: Abortion is bad. We are 
not sure exactly why, but we know that it’s morally questionable 
in some way. Therefore, women who get abortions must also be 
bad. Likewise, abortion providers must be shady and out to make 
money by preying on women. Many of the incremental 
restrictions feed into this generalized disapproval of abortion. 
TRAP laws are needed to rein in the crooked abortion providers. 
Waiting periods are needed because pregnant women are 
irresponsible and need to be forced to reflect on the gravity of 
their behavior. 
In fact, much opposition to abortion seems rooted in a belief 
that abortion encourages or excuses women’s sexual 
                                                                                                     
 40. See Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain Political 
Traction While Abortion Clinics—and the Women They Serve—Pay the Price, 16 
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 7, 7, 11–12 (2013) (explaining that TRAP laws often use 
concern for public health to conceal an actual purpose of making abortions less 
accessible to the public). 
 41. H.B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013). 
42. See Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 
797–99 (7th Cir. 2013) (questioning the medical justification for Wisconsin’s 
admitting privileges requirement). 
 43. See Gold & Nash, supra note 40, at 7–8 (explaining that abortion in the 
United States has consistently been an extremely safe medical procedure and 
that it has been highly regulated by the states).  
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irresponsibility. Abortion is an easy way out for licentious or rash 
behavior. People may also find unsettling or off-putting the idea 
that a pregnant woman would reject motherhood.44 Enduring the 
burdens of pregnancy, childbirth, and parenting is how women 
can make amends for poor choices about sex. Incremental 
restrictions fit this pattern. Many of these restrictions seem 
intended to make abortion less “easy” or appealing for women by 
imposing burdens that we do not impose when a woman chooses 
childbirth.45 Spousal or parental notice requirements suggest that 
women are not capable of making a responsible decision on their 
own, and that they cannot be trusted to consult family members 
voluntarily. Funding bans ensure that poor women bear the 
financial consequences of their irresponsible behavior. Pre-
abortion ultrasound mandates amount to a kind of shaming 
process in which women’s own bodies are used to show them the 
visual evidence of their guilt.46  
The theme of women’s irresponsibility also explains the 
popularity of certain exceptions to abortion bans. Polling shows 
that the public is most sympathetic to abortion in cases of serious 
endangerment of the woman’s health, grave fetal anomalies, and 
rape or incest.47 What all of these have in common are 
circumstances beyond the woman’s control.48 Health crises and 
fetal anomalies offer reasons for the abortion besides an easy way 
out from the burdens of motherhood. They suggest that the 
woman would embrace her pregnancy if only she could. They also 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 409, 414 (2013) (arguing that a “principal driver of abortion disgust” is 
“the idea that women would renounce motherhood given the opportunity to 
embrace it”). 
45.  See Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th, supra note 17, at 259–60. 
 46. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Constitutionality of Government-Imposed 
Bodily Intrusions, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (“Sonogram 
requirements threaten a woman’s sense of autonomy over her bodily decision-
making by giving no weight to her right to refuse. The woman has done (or is 
about to do something) bad, and so she forfeits her right to the inviolability of 
her body.”). 
 47. See BOWMAN & RUGG, supra note 21, at 12 (illustrating that, generally, 
a majority of the population believes abortion should be legal under certain 
circumstances such as when the pregnancy is the result of rape). 
 48. See id. (noting that a majority of the population would allow abortion in 
three situations completely out of the mother’s control). 
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show that, while we expect women to bear the burdens of 
pregnancy, childbirth, and perhaps parenting, there are some 
burdens we think are too much. Cases of rape and incest 
demonstrate most vividly the theme of irresponsibility or 
culpability. Women who become pregnant as a result of voluntary 
sex are guilty. They caused their own predicament. Women who 
were raped are innocent. To make them bear the burdens of 
pregnancy and childbirth would be unfair. 
These inferences, of course, are just that. It is hard to know 
exactly how the public feels about abortion restrictions because 
the people pushing for these restrictions are not the general 
public. The point of the incrementalist strategy is to increase 
opposition to abortion no matter the reasons.49 This is where we 
see the vague rhetoric against abortion weakening our public 
debate. We see public policy being formed based on simplistic 
declarations unmoored from the inevitably more nuanced facts.50 
Normally, we should diagnose what social problem we are trying 
to fix before we decide how to fix it. Instead, abortion restrictions 
are enacted based on disingenuous sound bites and factual 
falsehoods that activists advance and the media dutifully repeats. 
The congressional legislation to ban abortions at twenty weeks of 
pregnancy—passed by the House in June 2013 and introduced by 
Senator Lindsey Graham in November 2013—is a perfect 
illustration of this.51 The ban is based on the scientifically 
dubious claim that fetuses can feel pain at twenty weeks.52 
                                                                                                     
 49. Memorandum from Bopp & Coleson, supra note 33, at 5 (advising that 
“[t]he pro-life movement must at present avoid fighting on the more difficult 
terrain of its own position, namely arguing that abortion should not be available 
in cases of rape, incest, fetal deformity, and harm to the mother,” but 
acknowledging moral inconsistency exceptions for these cases). 
 50. See MORRIS FIORINA, DISCONNECT: THE BREAKDOWN OF REPRESENTATION 
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 73 (2009) (“Facts give way to ideology. Facts consistent 
with one’s position are emphasized, and those that are inconsistent are ignored 
or denied altogether. And if inaccurate or distorted information makes ordinary 
people believe such claims of no common ground, the potential for positive 
political action declines.”). 
 51. See Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 1797, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (prohibiting performance of abortion in most circumstances if the 
probable age of the fetus is twenty weeks or older); Pain-Capable Unborn Child 
Protection Act, S. 1670, 113th Cong. (2013) (same). 
 52. See, e.g., Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary 
Review of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947, 947 (2005) (concluding that 
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Senator Graham intimated that, by this stage of pregnancy, “you 
become you.”53 At the same time, both the House and Senate 
versions contain exceptions for rape and incest, exceptions wholly 
inconsistent with the entire premise of the bans.54 
This is no way to do public policy. Obviously, we ought not to 
be passing laws based on false factual premises. And the 
judgments about women that I have just described are equally 
troubling as bases for legislation. Why are these moral judgments 
about women not permissible foundations for law? First, the law 
must be based on reason. We ought to demand consistency in our 
laws. We cannot say that here an embryo has value and here it 
does not. Second, to try to codify moral judgments this nuanced is 
a hopeless task.55 The law is a blunt instrument, and we will 
often find that it produces unfair results. For example, who are 
we to presume that women having an abortion are rejecting 
motherhood, when the majority already are mothers, and when 
many are doing it precisely to protect existing children, or to be 
able to have children when they are financially able?56 And 
finally, whatever moral opinions we have about whether women 
are making a good decision are overridden by a far more 
important moral imperative: honoring the dignity and autonomy 
of women. 
Women choosing abortion are indeed making a moral 
decision. They are making a decision that reflects significant, 
conscientious deliberation over how best to govern their lives. Far 
                                                                                                     
“fetal perception of pain is unlikely before the third trimester”). 
 53. Mario Trujillo, Graham Readies 20-Week Abortion Ban, THE HILL (Nov. 
23, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/abortion/189067-
graham-proud-to-lead-20-week-abortion-fight-in-senate (last visited Jan. 8, 
2014) (“I am proud to lead this charge. This is a debate worthy of a great 
democracy. When do you become you: at twenty weeks of a pregnancy? What is 
the proper role of the government in protecting that child?” (quotations 
omitted)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 54. See Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 1797, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (providing that the twenty-week ban will not apply if “the pregnancy is 
the result of rape, or the result of incest against a minor”); Pain-Capable Unborn 
Child Protection Act, S. 1670, 113th Cong. (2013) (same). 
 55. See Borgmann, The Meaning, supra note 3, at 603–07. 
 56. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf (“About 
sixty-one percent of abortions are obtained by women who have one or more 
children.”). 
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from being irresponsible, women choosing abortion are doing so 
because they believe it is the most responsible decision they can 
make. However we may feel about the fact that a woman is 
unintentionally pregnant—and let us not forget that a man 
helped cause that predicament—we ought to applaud her for 
making the most prudent decision she can in light of that 
circumstance. At the very least, we should respect her right to 
make that decision. We allow people to make important moral 
decisions in other contexts, even if we don’t agree. For example, 
we allow people to decide to have another child when they 
already have many, and when the new child might stretch the 
family’s resources and ability to provide for their existing 
children. We might have a moral opinion about this, but we do 
not think it should be made illegal. 
Let us consider where Roe v. Wade comes down on the issue 
of women’s autonomy. Criticism of Roe has become commonplace 
even among some liberal legal scholars.57 My purpose here is not 
to defend Roe’s reasoning or its stated rationales. Rather, I would 
like to examine the frameworks of Roe and Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, and the extent to which they 
advance or inhibit women’s autonomy and dignity. 
The Roe opinion may lionize doctors, but Roe’s framework 
protected women’s autonomy by leaving to them the decision 
whether to continue a pregnancy, up until the point of fetal 
viability. Fetal viability marked the earliest moment when the 
state could impose its moral view of abortion on the woman.58 
Before this, a state could regulate abortion only to protect 
women’s health, and the strict scrutiny standard ensured that 
                                                                                                     
 57. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe 
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (agreeing with the principles behind Roe and 
indicating they would be valid if enacted by legislation, but offering several 
critiques of the Roe opinion); see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: 
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working 
Paper No. 131, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=990968 (discussing 
legal scholars who have credited Roe with provoking a popular backlash against 
abortion rights). 
 58. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“With respect to the State’s 
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at 
viability.”). 
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disingenuous claims to protect women’s health would be ferreted 
out.59  
Now, the governing framework is the undue burden standard 
established by Casey,60 as further interpreted by Gonzales v. 
Carhart.61 These decisions have weakened protection for women’s 
autonomy in two ways. First, they have expanded the permissible 
reasons a state may regulate abortion before viability to include 
moral opposition to abortion.62 In addition, the scrutiny applied to 
such regulation has been weakened from strict scrutiny to the 
undue burden standard.63 The Court in Gonzales v. Carhart paid 
extraordinary deference to congressional fact-finding, applying 
the undue burden standard in a manner that allows states and 
pro-life advocates to promote and defend abortion restrictions 
based on disingenuous reasons and misrepresentations of the 
facts.64 Casey and Carhart have thus helped to impoverish our 
public debate about abortion. These decisions have encouraged 
superficial, unthoughtful treatment of the abortion issue. 
Abortion is cheap ethics. It allows us to point our finger from 
the comfort of our chairs, without putting a lot of thought into the 
issue and without making sacrifices. It is much less satisfying to 
see abortion as a nuanced, complex moral decision not well suited 
to bright legal line-drawing.  It is harder to acknowledge that the 
problems affecting women that truly cry out for our attention are 
daunting issues like poverty, job discrimination, racism, 
homophobia, rape, and domestic violence. But it has been forty 
years since Roe v. Wade was decided. This country is not at war 
                                                                                                     
 59. Id.; see also, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52, 75–79 (1976) (striking down ban on saline amniocentesis method of 
abortion, which the legislature claimed was necessary to protect women’s 
health). 
 60. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
 61. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007). 
 62. See id. at 156–60 (providing the congressional justifications for the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking 
Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 
680–82, 689–95 (2004) [hereinafter Borgmann, Winter Count] (discussing 
Casey’s expansion of permissible justifications for pre-viability abortion 
restrictions).  
 63. See Borgmann, Winter Count, supra note 62, at 680–89 (discussing the 
significance of the undue burden standard). 
 64. See generally Caitlin E. Borgmann, Judicial Evasion and Disingenuous 
Appeals to Science in the Abortion Controversy, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 15 (2008). 
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over that decision. This country is ready to move on, to attend to 
the unfinished task of ensuring that all women are treated as 
full, equal, and respected members of our society. Let us turn our 
attention to that charge. 
